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INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW: HOW RUSSIA AND THE U.S. ARE AT ODDS IN THE
FINAL FRONTIER
Matthew G. Looper

INTRODUCTION
The dual-purpose of this article is to 1.) provide insight into the history of RussianAmerican space relations through the lens of international law, and 2.) show how cooperation
between these two world powers is beginning to wane. In particular, the arrival of China on the
space scene has finally given Russia a non-Western minded partner in space. Advancements in
military technology in space have also raised concerns for the future of space relations, as we see
the importance of satellites for on-the-ground operations continue to grow and become
commonplace for the U.S., Russia, and now China. This article will show that as Russia and the
U.S. grow further apart in space, they risk breaking with a tradition of cooperation that has
sustained peace for decades.

I.

THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION: A PRODUCT OF U.S.-RUSSIA COOPERATION

The U.S. and Russia have been long-time partners in space. Russians and Americans have
been working together in space for over two decades, and have been quite literally working
together in space since astronaut Bill Shepherd and cosmonauts Yuri Gidzenko and Sergei
Krikalev became the first crew to reside onboard the International Space Station (ISS) in
November 2000.1 While the ISS has had visitors from nineteen countries, over its history it has
principally been a joint Russian-American endeavor, exemplified by how the station itself is
divided into two sections: the Russian Orbital Segment (ROS) operated by Russia, and the United
States Orbital Segment (USOS) run by the United States and other partner nations.2 The
International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement, or IGA, is a January 1998 international
treaty signed by the fifteen governments involved in the Space Station project. 3 This agreement
establishes “a long-term international cooperative framework among the Partners, on the basis of
genuine partnership, for the detailed design, development, operation, and utilization of a
permanently inhabited civil Space Station for peaceful purposes, in accordance with international
law.”4 The IGA marks the first of a series of agreements that govern every aspect of the ISS,
ranging from jurisdictional issues to a code of conduct among visiting astronauts.5 Commencing
1

History and Timeline of the ISS, ISS NATIONAL LABORATORY, https://www.issnationallab.org/about/iss-timeline/
(last visited Nov. 23, 2021).
2
See Peter B. de Selding, Russia — and Its Modules — To Part Ways with ISS in 2024, SPACE NEWS, (Feb. 25,
2015), https://spacenews.com/russia-and-its-modules-to-part-ways-with-iss-in-2024/. See generally Mark
Garcia, Visitors to the Station by Country, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/feature/visitors-to-the-station-by-country/
(last visited Nov. 23, 2021).
3
International Space Station legal framework, THE EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY,
https://www.esa.int/Science_Exploration/Human_and_Robotic_Exploration/International_Space_Station/Internation
al_Space_Station_legal_framework (last visited Nov. 28, 2021).
4
The International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement, art. 1, Jan. 29, 1998, https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/12927-Multilateral-Space-Space-Station-1.29.1998.pdf.
5
See André Farand, Astronauts’ behaviour [sic] onboard the International Space Station: regulatory framework,
INTERNET ARCHIVE,
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only a few short years after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the IGA
represents the beginning of a new, cooperative regime of peaceful space exploration by the United
States and Russia.
II.

THE OUTER SPACE TREATY

This multilateral space regime traces its roots back to Russian-American cooperation on
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (OST), a treaty that lists the principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of space.6 The treaty serves as the foundation of international
space law, namely prohibiting deployments of nuclear weapons in space, the construction of
military facilities on the Moon, and the national appropriation of natural space objects, as well as
requiring all off-world facilities to be open to all visitors.7 The exact language used in the treaty is
important, as current developments in space militarization may soon threaten the once-harmonious
space relationship between the U.S. and Russia.
Article IV of the OST provides that:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth
any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in
outer space in any other manner. The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used
by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The
establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any
type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be
forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other
peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility
necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also
not be prohibited.8
The prohibition on positioning nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in space
is straightforward, but less straightforward is defining what “peaceful purposes” are. Asking what
constitutes “peaceful purposes” is therefore the central question, as that will likely determine
whether a nation is in violation of Article IV of the OST. Two popular legal interpretations have
emerged to define the “peaceful purposes” language: the “non-military” interpretation and the
“non-aggressive” interpretation.9 Proponents of the “non-military” interpretation argue that
“exclusively for peaceful purposes” must exclude any use for military-related purposes, while
https://web.archive.org/web/20060913194014/http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/file_download.php/785db0eec4e0cdfc
43e1923624154cccFarand.pdf.
6
See generally Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, (Jan. 27, 1967), https://treaties.unoda.org/t/outer_space.
7
Lillian Posner & Evan Sankey, The U.S. and Russia are Parting Ways in Space and That's Risky, NATIONAL
INTEREST (May 7, 2021), https://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-and-russia-are-parting-ways-space-and-thats-risky184506 (last visited Dec. 3, 2021).
8
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. 4, Jan. 27, 1967,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
9
Jeremy J. Grunert, Grounding the Humā: The Legality of Space Denial and (Potential) American Interference in
the Iranian Space Program, 81 A.F. L. REV. 76, 101 (2020),
https://www.afjag.af.mil/Portals/77/documents/Law%20Review/Law%20Review%2081.pdf?ver=PqiJkS0AI3-MH-aS6YcXA%3d%3d.
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proponents of the “non-aggressive” interpretation argue that the language only prohibits uses that
are inherently aggressive — violations of the U.N. Charter and international law.10
It has been the longstanding approach of the United States, and indeed the majority of
nations, to support the “non-aggressive” interpretation of “peaceful purposes.”11 When interpreting
treaties, Article 31 Section 3 Part III of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
requires that, “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”12
Thus, we must look to the ordinary or customary meaning of the words “peaceful purpose.” Dr.
Alex Meyer applies this rule to the OST by looking to the Charter of the United Nations, where
the term “peaceful” is ordinarily regarded to mean “non-aggressive.”13 To define “nonaggressive”, we look toward the General Assembly’s adoption of Resolution 3314 (XXIX) in
December 1974.14
Article 3 of Resolution 3314 (XXIX) clarifies what constitutes aggressive acts:
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject
to and in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion
or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another State or
part thereof,
Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State
or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;
An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine
and air fleets of another State;
The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State
with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions
provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory
beyond the termination of the agreement;
The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of
another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression
against a third State;

10

Id.
Id. at 101-02.
12
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
13
Manasa S Venkatachalam, What does it take to violate Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty: Looking to Artemis
for the celestial answer, ILA Reporter, Aug. 27, 2021, https://ilareporter.org.au/2021/08/what-does-it-take-toviolate-article-iv-of-the-outer-space-treaty-looking-to-artemis-for-the-celestial-answer-manasa-s-venkatachalam/.
14
Grunert, supra note 9, at 103-04.
11
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The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.15
Thus, looking to Resolution 3314 (XXIX), “aggressive” conduct in space is much more
limited compared to the more broadly encompassing “military” uses, as a “military-related
purpose” could be anything just slightly associated with the military.16 Many space technologies
are inherently dual-use with the military, such as rocketry, satellite navigation, remote sensing,
satellite observation, and so on.17 Anything that involves observing the surface of the Earth will
naturally include surveillance and information gathering which then can be used for military
purposes. It’s no wonder, then, that a majority of nations agree that the “non-military”
interpretation is untenable; not only is it too over encompassing, it’s also just not practical. There
is already extensive use of satellites for military reconnaissance, namely by the U.S., which in turn
provides information to the armed services of allies like Canada, the UK, and the Netherlands,
indicating an international acceptance of satellite use for military purposes that is not considered
to violate the “peaceful purposes” requirement of Article IV of the OST.18
Article IV of the OST is not alone in causing a rift between the U.S. and Russia. Conflicting
interpretations over Articles II and XII of the treaty have also led to the U.S. acting more
unilaterally in space, such as through the Artemis Accords.19 The Artemis Accords is a component
of the Artemis Program, a United States-led international human spaceflight program, the primary
goal of which is to return humans to the Moon by 2024.20 The Artemis Accords are a non-treaty
agreement portion of the Artemis Program that asserts, among other things, signatories’ right to
own mineral wealth extracted from the Moon, and declares “safety zones” around each nations’
space operations to prevent harmful interference by other space actors.21 Russia and China, which
have become an increasingly major players in space, argue that this agreement is in violation of
Articles II and XII of the OST.22 Article II provides that, “Outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means
of use or occupation, or by any other means.”23 Article XII provides that, “All stations,
installations, equipment, and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies shall be open
to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity.” 24 Although it
would seem that the plain language of these provisions bans a nation from extracting and owning
lunar minerals, as well as the exclusive “safety zones” that would be used to protect national
interests on the Moon, under America’s specific interpretation of the language these operations
would be permissible; notably, of the fourteen signatories to the agreement, only the United States
15

Id.
Id. at 104.
17
Id. at 102.
18
Ricky J. Lee & Sarah L. Steele, Military Use of Satellite Communications, Remote Sensing, and Global
Positioning Systems in the War on Terror, 79 J. AIR L. & COM. 69, 77, (2014),
https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1334&context=jalc.
19
Posner & Sankey, supra note 7.
20
Explore Moon to Mars, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/moontomars/index.html (last visited Nov. 29,
2021).
21
Posner & Sankey, supra note 7.
22
Id.
23
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 2.
24
Id. at art. 12.
16
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has the potential to conduct such operations.25 Under the U.S. Space Resource Exploration and
Utilization Act of 2015, the U.S. doesn’t assert “sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or
jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body”, which would be in violation of the OST,
but instead "provides for property rights relating to minerals already extracted.26 Given that the
exclusive nature of the Artemis Accords heavily favors the U.S. through this interpretation, Russia
and China have refused to sign the agreement.27

III.

SOVIET-ERA SPACE TREATIES

Although Russia challenges the U.S.’s interpretation of Articles II and XII of the OST,
historically the U.S. and Russia have seen eye to eye on international space law and are signatories
to the same international treaties that govern state behavior in space: the Partial Test Ban Treaty
of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Rescue Agreement of 1968, the Liability Convention
of 1972, and the Registration Convention of 1976.28 Neither Russia, the U.S., nor China (i.e., the
three countries that engage in self-launched human spaceflight) are signatories to the 1984 Moon
Treaty; as such, the treaty holds little to no relevancy in international law.29 These remaining
treaties combine to form the present-day rule of law in space, an accomplishment which wouldn’t
have been possible without U.S.-Russia cooperation.
Prior to the OST, which has already been discussed at length, the only international law on
space activity was the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. This treaty, signed one day short of the
eighteenth anniversary of the first atomic bomb falling on Hiroshima, prohibited nuclear weapons
testing under water, in the atmosphere, or in outer space.30 This treaty proved that the United
States and Russia (then the USSR) could cooperate in space, an important accomplishment in of
itself, considering that it was signed just a year after the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the two
nations dangerously close to nuclear war.31
After the OST came the Rescue Agreement of 1968, the shortest of the international space
treaties at only ten articles, which is primarily concerned with ensuring astronauts (here, referring
to American astronauts and their Soviet/(Russian) counterparts, cosmonauts) are returned safely
25

Posner & Sankey, supra note 7; Jeff Foust, Mexico joins Artemis Accords, SPACE NEWS (Dec. 10, 2021),
https://spacenews.com/mexico-joins-artemis-accords/ (last visited (Dec. 20, 2021).
26
Paul Arthur Berkman et al., OUTER SPACE LAW: RUSSIA – UNITED STATES COMMON CHALLENGES AND
PERSPECTIVES, 1 MOSCOW J. INT’L L. 20, 23 (2018),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326948007_OUTER_SPACE_LAW_RUSSIA__UNITED_STATES_COMMON_CHALLENGES_AND_PERSPECTIVES (quoting Space Resource Exploration
and
Utilization Act of 2015, H.R. 2262, 114th Cong. § 51303 (2015) www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/housebill/2262/text>).
27
Id.
28
See generally Space Law Treaties and Principles, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF.,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2021).
29
Jonathan Sydney Koch, Institutional Framework for the Province of all Mankind: Lessons from the International
Seabed Authority for the Governance of Commercial Space Mining, 16 INT’L J. SPACE POL. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2018).
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14777622.2017.1381824?casa_token=F_azMKp0HWQAAAAA:Ap
EjnuFXQhkXvOkEa-8Dcrrxb5VtdD5W6gEuS6TdAEzhpR8XNh8yKRkzJPS1iN8RnlgM-KP1V4eV.
30
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM,
https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/nuclear-test-ban-treaty (last visited Nov. 29, 2021).
31
Id.

VOL. 18.2

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

116

to Earth.32 “Currently it has 90 states parties and a further 24 states as signatories”—quite a large
basis of support considering that at the time it was signed only two states, the U.S. and Russia, had
astronauts; an example of how Russian-American cooperation has historically dominated
international space relations.33
Next came the Liability Convention of 1972, which in Article II declares that a “launching
State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the
surface of the earth or to aircraft flight.”34 Article III explains that in the slightly different context
of damage caused to a space object by a space object of another launching State, “the latter shall
be liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible.”35
The Liability Convention’s terms have only been invoked once, during “the Cosmos 954 fiasco of
1978”, “when a Soviet satellite inadvertently fell to Earth in uninhabited Canadian territory.”36
Ultimately, the Canadian claims against the USSR were not brought before a claims commission
established under the Liability Convention.37 Instead, the countries found a diplomatic solution
where the U.S. would assist Canada in debris cleanup and transfer the Soviet satellite remnants to
the U.S.38 This avoided a messy legal dispute between one of America’s closest allies and its greatpower rival. Because Canada’s claim was for the cost of cleanup, rather than property damage, it
was not clear whether the Liability Convention was the controlling authority.39 This diplomatic
solution on the part of the U.S. shows how important healthy relations with Russia in space have
been for the international community, even when the initial incident didn’t directly involve the
U.S.
Lastly, there is the Registration Convention of 1976. Ratification of this treaty was not as
widespread as the previous ones: “only 44 states are parties to the Convention, with a further 4
states having signed but not ratified.”40 This is likely due to the fact that ratification is really only
relevant to states launching objects into outer space, which is still a minority of countries.41 Like
the Rescue Agreement and the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention is essentially
elaborating on one specific Article of the OST.42 That Article is Article VIII, which already
provides the framework for the registration of space objects and the possibility to exercise
jurisdiction over such objects once they’ve been registered.43 The primary motivation for states to
ratify this treaty stems from the fact that only states party to the Convention are entitled to formally
32

Frans G. von der Dunk, A SLEEPING BEAUTY AWAKENS: THE 1968 RESCUE AGREEMENT AFTER FORTY
YEARS, 34 J. SPACE L. 411, 411 (2008)
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1028&context=spacelaw.
33
Id. at 418-19.
34
Trevor Kehrer, Closing the Liability Loophole: The Liability Convention and the Future of Conflict in Space, 20
CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 180, 183 (2019)
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1756&context=cjil.
35
Id. at 183-84.
36
Id. at 185.
37
Id. at 185-86.
38
Id. at 186.
39
Id.
40
Frans G. von der Dunk, THE REGISTRATION CONVENTION: BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT,
AM. INST. AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS 450, 450 (2003),
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=spacelaw.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 451.
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protest and bring forward legal claims in case another party to the Convention fails to comply with
its duties under it.44 This is because, under general public international law, only states parties to
a treaty may consider their rights to be violated if another party does not fulfil the relevant
obligations.45
These treaties are very real legal obligations that the U.S. and Russia have to each other as
fellow signatories, but they also serve as reminders of how, despite decades of hostile relations
with one another, these two countries have been able to come to an agreement (in this case, many
agreements) that hold one another accountable for their actions in space. However, complacency
is dangerous. Considering that the last of these treaties entered into force in 1976, it should come
as no surprise that those forty-five years of inactivity have led to peaceful relations beginning to
chill. There’s a paradigm shift happening in space, and as the rift between the U.S. and Russia
widens, it can only spell disaster for the international space community.

IV.

RUSSIAN SPACE LAW

To understand the paradigm shift happening in space, we must first understand domestic
space law in Russia. Russian space law is largely governed by Federal Law No. 5663-1.46 “This
law is directed at ensuring the legal regulation of space activities for the purpose of developing the
economy, science and technology, strengthening the defense and the security of the Russian
Federation[,] and furthering the international cooperation of the Russian Federation.” 47 Adopted
in 1993, this law highlights that the exploration and use of outer space is the “highest priority of
the [state’s] interests,” and outlines the scope of space activities, including such activities as
scientific research, technology uses, manned space flights, etc.48 This federal law codifies that
Russian space activities are subject both to Russian domestic law and international treaties signed
by Russia, and that Russia will defer to relevant international agreements to settle issues such as
the jurisdiction and control over space objects, the registration of such objects, and ownership
rights.49 Federal Law No. 5663-1 also covers how space activities are related to Russian national
security. Discussed in the purpose statement and reiterated again in Article II, one of the areas
covered by space activities is “the use of space technology, space materials and space technology
in the interests of the defense and security of the Russian Federation.”50 Article IV notes that space
activities, “shall be implemented with the observation of the requirements, as established by law,
for the protection of state secrets, military and commercial secrets[,] as well as the results of

44

Id.
Id.
46
Seonhee Kim, SPARC Brief: Russia, U. WASH. SPACE POL’Y AND RES. CTR., https://www.sparc.uw.edu/russia/
(last visited Dec. 2, 2021); see generally
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL'STVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of
Legislation], Dec. 18, 2006, No. 5663-1 (Russ.),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/rus_e/wtaccrus58_leg_375.pdf [hereinafter Federal Law No. 5663-1].
47
Federal Law No. 5663-1, supra note 46.
48
Kim, supra note 46; Federal Law No. 5663-1, supra note 46.
49
Kim, supra note 46; Federal Law No. 5663-1, supra note 46.
50
Kim, supra note 46; Federal Law No. 5663-1, supra note 46, at art. 2.
45
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intellectual activities and exclusive rights to them.”51 As such, it seems this federal law recognizes
the need and intent for Russia to use space for military purposes.52
Outside of the use of space for military purposes, Russia law has also allowed for the
commercial use of space. As mentioned above, Article IV of Federal Law No. 5563-1 establishes
use of space for the protection of commercial secrets, as well as the protection of commercial
secrets of foreign organizations and citizens under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation per
Article XXVII.53 Additionally, Article VI provides that the Federal Space Program “organize and
coordinate the work of commercial space projects and assists [sic] in their implementations . . . .”54
To this end, Roscosmos, the Russian Federal Space Agency, is deeply embedded in the global
space market, serving as the coordinating hub for both civilian and military space activities.55
Russia engages in the commercialized space market through Roscosmos, promoting its
technologies, launch capabilities, and human capital to countries with developed space industries
like the U.S.56 For example, Russian space exports such as the RD-180 rocket engines and in-space
electric propulsion technologies are vital to American customers like NASA, SpaceX, and
Lockheed Martin.57
A. AN ASCENDANT V. DESCENDANT PRIVATE SPACE SECTOR
Although Roscosmos engages in big business with governments and companies around the
world, CNN reported in 2015 that the agency is plagued by shady transactions and corruption
scandals. In 2014 alone, Roscosmos committed 92 billion rubles ($1.8 billion) worth of financial
violations, according to Russia's public spending watchdog agency.58 At the center of this financial
crisis is the construction of the Vostochny Cosmodrome, the new space launch site in the eastern
part of Russia that was originally set to open by the end of 2015.59 The cosmodrome is crucial for
Russia's ability to independently launch rockets, as the country still relies on the Soviet-era
Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan for rocket launches. Construction for the project started in
2012, and since then it has suffered a series of setbacks due to funding problems, as Roscosmos’
budget for the next decade was slashed in 2015 by 35% to 2 trillion rubles ($37 billion).60
Construction for the project started in 2012, and since then it has suffered a series of setbacks due
to funding problems, as Roscosmos’ budget for the next decade was slashed in 2015 by 35% to

51

Federal Law No. 5663-1, supra note 46, at art. 4.
Kim, supra note 46.
53
Federal Law No. 5663-1, supra note 46, at art. 4, 27.
54
Federal Law No. 5663-1, supra note 46, at art. 6.
55
Kim, supra note 46.
56
See supra text accompanying note 46.
57
See supra text accompanying note 46.
58
Ivana Kottasova, $1.8 billion disappears in Russian space program, CNN BUSINESS, May 25, 2015,
https://money.cnn.com/2015/05/25/technology/russia-space-corruption/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2021).
59
Id.
60
Kottasova, supra note 58; Four More Jailed For Corruption At Cosmodrome Project In Russia's Far East, RADIO
FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-vostochny-cosmodrome-corruption/31558418.html
(last visited Dec. 3, 2021).
52
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2two trillion rubles ($37 billion).61 To add to the financial woes, Tatyana Golikova, the audit chief,
said the cosmodrome’s construction costs have ballooned by 20%.62
The project also suffered from alleged corruption. In 2015, a crewless cargo space ship
burned up in the Earth's atmosphere after a communication failure, and a Proton-M carrier rocket
carrying a Mexican satellite crashed in Siberia, both of which were blamed at the time on chronic
corruption in the space industry by then-deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin. And the
corruption allegations haven’t improved since then. In 2019, a Kremlin spokesman said that eleven
billion rubles ($154.2 million) had been embezzled during the construction of the Vostochny
Cosmodrome.63 Prosecutors said later that year that 163 probes had been launched against
individuals involved in the construction, and that about 60 people had already been convicted.64
Construction continues at the time of writing.65
In contrast to the languishing efforts of Russia to have a space industry that can stand on
its own two feet, the U.S.’s private sector companies have entered a space renaissance, spurring
investment in a wide array of complementary services necessary for the success of private sector
and government spacecraft alike.66 For example, in February 2020, Maxar Technologies was
awarded a $142 million contract from NASA to develop a robotic construction tool that would be
assembled in space for use on a low earth orbit spacecraft.67 In 2019, Made In Space, Inc. received
a $74 million contract to 3Dprint large metal beams in space for use on a NASA spacecraft.68
Future private sector spacecrafts will have similar manufacturing needs, which these space
infrastructure companies will be well positioned to fulfill.69
While the growing volume of tech companies providing essential goods and services to
NASA is certainly a great achievement for the private space sector, arguably the greatest
achievement for the industry has been the success of SpaceX. In 2012 SpaceX became the first
company to launch a resupply mission to the ISS.70 Three years later, it landed the first stage of
an orbital rocket for the first time in history.71 The company now operates the most powerful rocket
in the world, Falcon Heavy, and in 2019, it launched 13 of the 21 U.S. flights to orbit.72 But what
is the achievement that has received the most coverage? SpaceX was the first company to fly
humans into orbit on its own spacecraft and was followed in July 2021 by two more American
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companies who ventured into space—Virgin Galactic and Blue Origin.73 Virgin Galactic launched
53.5 miles above the Earth’s surface on one of the company's rocket-powered planes, while Blue
Origin launched 62 miles aboard its New Shepard rocket. Both planes landed at the edge of space
and achieved zero-gravity.74 In November 2021, SpaceX successfully brought four astronauts to
the ISS, who joined three inhabitants already on the space station: a NASA astronaut and two
Russian cosmonauts, who were in the middle of a nearly yearlong mission.75 The arrival of four
American astronauts on a commercial spaceflight, rendezvousing with two Russian cosmonauts
whose country doesn’t have a fully constructed space center to launch rockets, is indicative of just
how far the split between Russian and American space capabilities has become.76
This paradigm of success between two equally old space programs perhaps further
entrenches the idea in U.S. policy makers that America doesn’t need cooperation with Russia to
be successful in space. Yet, hope is not lost. An agreement is in the works for an astronaut
exchange program, where a Russian cosmonaut will fly aboard a SpaceX mission to the ISS in
September 2022 in exchange for a future flight with a NASA astronaut onboard Russia’s Soyuz
spacecraft.77 While hope remains for future Russian-American space cooperation, the
militarization of space signals that soon the partnership that birthed the ISS may be replaced by a
space arms race.

V.

THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE

That the U.S. and Russia, who have engaged in great power competition for decades,
subject themselves to the same international laws in space and have historically good-working
relations is an often underappreciated fact. But that relationship has taken a hit as the world looks
toward space as the next and final stage for how nations wage war. The 2006 U.S. National Space
Policy authorized the United States to actively defend its interests in space and to deny access to
space to nations that the United States determined were using space in a way hostile to U.S.
national interests.78 Russia, along with China, criticized the U.S. for this aggressive, unilateral
approach.79 The 2006 U.S. National Space Policy states in relevant part that the United States will
“preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from
either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions
necessary to protect its space capabilities; [and] respond to interference.”80 This policy, which
George W. Bush issued as a presidential directive, largely reiterates the rights that international
space treaties already granted to the U.S., namely the OST, and how the U.S. will take “actions
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necessary” to defend these rights.81 However, Russia’s criticism of this policy stems from it
implying the potential for the U.S. to engage in military action to protect U.S. national interests in
space—a possible violation of the OST.82 This implication is made especially clear in the portion
of the policy that states that the U.S. may “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space
capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.”, which would necessarily involve military power.83
Article I of the OST provides that space “shall be free for exploration and use by all States without
discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law.”84
Exclusion of a nation from space would likely constitute discrimination, and thus enforcement of
this provision of the policy is likely prohibited by the OST.85
The 2006 U.S. National Space Policy also provides that “the United States will oppose the
development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to
or use of Outer Space.”86 This rejection of any new multilateral treaty that seeks to limit American
activities in space was the beginning of the U.S.’s march toward unilateralism, as ever since, the
U.S. has avoided negotiating on any new international space laws and has doubled down on
protecting its existing rights, like the 2015 U.S. Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act’s
protection of property rights to minerals in space.87
In June 2010, President Barack Obama issued a new presidential directive on National
Space Policy (NSP10) that echoed many of the same goals as the NSP06 but with a more
cooperative tone.88 In contrast to the language found in the NSP06, which implied the necessary
use of military force as a means of discriminating against nations hostile to U.S. interests, the
language of the NSP10 focuses more on self-defense, an uncontested right, and deviates from the
previous nationalistic tone by applying this to allied space systems: “[C]onsistent with the inherent
right of self-defense, [the United States may] deter others from interference and attack, defend our
space systems and contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat
efforts to attack them.”89 Another stark contrast with the NSP06 can be found in the new policy’s
call for openness and transparency—signaling a move away from the Bush Administration’s more
unilateral attitude.90 Additionally, the more hostile language of the NSP06, like denying a nation
access to space, was removed, signaling how the U.S. may now be more amenable to stricter
international space armament laws.91 Still, the NSP10 is ultimately a continuation of the strong
national security stance taken in the NSP06.
Although the U.S. has pulled back on the strong language found in the NSP06, the level of
space cooperation very well could be dependent on the presidential administration, with
Republican administrations following the militaristic posture found in Bush’s national space
policy, and Democratic administrations following the cooperative posture found in Obama’s
directive. Evidence seems to point toward this space policy flipflopping being a predictable
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pattern, including the Trump Administration’s establishment of the United States Space Force, an
overt move toward preparing for military action in space.92 This frequent change by the world’s
strongest military in an area as important as space warfare toys with international expectations of
how the U.S. will react to dilemmas in space. Will the United States pursue a legal solution when
confronted with possible threats in space, or will it exercise its “right” to deny hostile nations space
access? This unpredictability can only lead to miscalculation. If current trends progress, there is a
very real possibility that Russia will be the one making the miscalculation.
Speaking at a disarmament conference in Geneva in February 2019, Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed Moscow’s concern over the militarization of space, saying, “The
plans of the United States, France and the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole to launch weapons
into space are gaining more and more real shape.”93 Clearly, the U.S.’s increased military interest
in space has not gone unnoticed. But the U.S. is not alone. As of 2018, according to the Union of
Concerned Scientists, the U.S. military uses over 170 satellites, while the Russian military operates
97 satellites.94 American and Russian military use of satellites have played a part in their recent
conflicts in the Middle East—conflicts where the two sides have supported opposing factions,
using intel from their respective satellites to further their military goals on the ground. 95 As Russia
and the U.S. increasingly use space for opposing military actions planet-side, Russia has begun
looking elsewhere for partnership in space.

VI.

THE RUSSIA-CHINA SPACE GANG

The split in American-Russian space relations has led Russia to seek out a more equal
partnership with China.96 Where the ISS once served as a symbol of U.S.-Russia cooperation, with
American astronauts often launched there aboard Russian Soyuz spacecraft, that cooperation is
now breaking down.97 “The success of NASA’s commercial crew partnership with SpaceX and
Boeing means that American astronauts will increasingly fly to low Earth orbit on American
spacecraft rather than the Russian Soyuz[,]” the National Interest reports.98 The most expensive
object ever constructed at over $100 billion, the ISS will likely run out of U.S. funding by 2030,
and Russia has announced that it is considering withdrawing from the ISS in 2025 to develop its
own space station.99
Not only does Russia have plans to build its own space station, but in March 2021 Russia
also announced that it and China have agreed to jointly construct a lunar space station dedicated
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to “strengthening research cooperation and promoting the exploration and use of outer space for
peaceful purposes in the interests of all mankind.”100 This international lunar scientific research
station (ILRS), despite having no completion timeline, is perhaps the biggest wake-up call to
American politicians and military leaders to China’s rise in space capabilities, which it has
accomplished without U.S. assistance thanks to an American law known as the Wolf Amendment,
which bans cooperation with China in space.101 This means that Russia and other nations outside
the close inner circle of American allies may now form their own space bloc with China. 102 The
China National Space Administration said in its statement that the ILRS would be "open to all
countries," and Roscosmos said that the two space agencies planned to "promote cooperation on
the creation of an open access ILRS for all interested countries and international partners. . . .”103
Despite the promises of being an internationally pen space station dedicated to peaceful research
and exploration, a joint Russia-China space station is a threat to America’s position in space. As
we covered above, space is becoming increasingly important militarily, and as tensions ramp up
with China planet-side, a stronger China in space partnering with Russia raises grave national
security concerns.
The Wolf Amendment, named after Congressman Frank Wolf (R-Va.) who introduced it
in 2011, has arguably led to a more powerful, independent China in space.104 The amendment was
included in the NASA authorization bill and prohibits the space agency and the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy from spending any appropriated money on cooperation
with China.105 In order to work with China, the agency would have to get permission from the FBI,
who would have to certify that there were no risks to sharing information and that none of the
Chinese officials involved had committed human rights abuses.106 Though admirable in its attempt
to punish China for human rights abuses, the Wolf Amendment is mutually damaging to the U.S.
because it forced China to not rely on American cooperation in space, leading to Chinese
advancements that threaten to rival American space dominance. Such advancements since 2011
include: the launch of a Chinese space station, the deployment of new heavy-lift rockets, and
successful robotic missions to the Moon and Mars.107 Additionally, in December 2020, China's
unmanned Chang'e mission brought lunar samples back to Earth, making it only the third country
to have successfully collected rocks from the moon.108 China also has plans underway to send
astronauts to the moon by the 2030s; if successful, China would become only the second country
after the U.S. to put a citizen on the moon.109
Despite Wolf’s retirement from Congress in 2015, the Wolf Amendment language has been
included in each year’s appropriations bills.110 Given that the ISS is expected to retire by 2030,
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unless an American company like SpaceX launches a space station, the Chinese station that Beijing
is expected to finish building in 2022 may soon be the only choice for Russia, the EU, and Japan,
who have all expressed a desire to conduct experiments in low-Earth orbit.111 Even if a new
American space station is built, there is good reason to believe that the flip-flopping of presidential
administrations on space issues would serve as a deterrent for nations who would otherwise seek
American space cooperation.112
Partnered with an ascendent China, Russia has proposed a “Treaty on the Prevention of the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Object
(PPWT), which would ban conventional weapons in space.”113 American commentators have
decried this proposal as intended to restrict the U.S.’s capabilities “while doing nothing to address
Chinese and Russian ground-based anti-space capabilities.”114 Bradley Bowman, the senior
director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, wrote in Foreign Policy how Russia would use this treaty to tie the U.S.’s hands and
then simply continue to test weapons in space. A July 2020 incident indicated that when a Russian
satellite fired what appeared to be an anti-satellite space torpedo during a weapons test.115 Bowman
believes Russia’s conduct following the PPWT would be similar to how for more than a decade
before its demise in 2019, Moscow used the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty to
constrain the United States while Russia produced, flight-tested, and fielded a ground-launched
intermediate-range cruise missile in direct contravention of the treaty.116 Even if Russia doesn’t
blatantly disregard the PPWT, the treaty lacks any verification plan to ensure compliance and
contains no restrictions on the development and stockpiling of anti-satellite weapons on the
ground.117 Meaning, if a nation like Russia or China decides to withdraw from the treaty, it could
readily deploy space-based weapons previously developed on the ground.118
There is a real fear that a Chinese-Russian space alliance will lead to the continual
militarization of space as two blocs form, with countries wishing to participate in space forced to
pick between a North Atlantic-Japanese bloc led by the U.S., and a Chinese-Russian bloc led by
an increasingly advanced China. But for the sake of not sounding alarmist, there is also good cause
to believe that any significant threat Russia and China may pose in space is still years off, as right
now the balance of power is heavily skewed in the U.S.’s favor.119 At $40 billion, the combined
U.S. civil and military space budget is nearly as large as the rest of the world combined, and of the
3,372 operational artificial satellites now in Earth’s orbit, 56% are controlled by the U.S.
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government or American entities.120 Still, to protect national security the U.S. must be wary of the
changes in space power and keep abreast of how proposed international laws like the PPWT may
advocate for peace on paper, but, in reality, only serve to tip the scales in Russia and China’s favor.

CONCLUSION
The United States and Russia have had a long history of space cooperation, an
underappreciated fact that is often lost in the tumult of sensational news concerning potential
conflicts with Russia and China. This news has its place; we’ve seen how Russian-Sino
cooperation in space is real, and if the United States and its allies are not careful, we may find
ourselves in a space-arms race between global powers. But if the United States reflects on how
cooperation between Russia and the U.S. in the past has proved beneficial, it may realize that
cooperation is the best path going forward, not just for dealing with Russia, but also an emergent
China. The Wolf Amendment was passed in light of valid concerns of Chinese human rights
abuses, but restricting the U.S.’s ability to cooperate with one of the world’s preeminent powers
in an area as important as space will only serve to hurt the U.S., and the international space
community, in the long run. There already exists a strong base for the rule of law in space thanks
to treaties like the OST. It is this mutual obligation under the law that has preserved peace in space.
Addressing disputes in space through international forums and continuing to build on regulations
is the best way to ensure future cooperation for research, technological advancement, and avoiding
the deterioration of the rule of law. There is a hope for peace in space founded on decades of
cooperation. As long as Russia and the U.S. continue this tradition, the future of our space relations
will show the world that even military rivals can achieve peace in the final frontier.
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